Guatemala Elections: Mapping the Threat from Organized Crime
By Steven Dudley
As part of a project to study political risk leading up to Guatemala's presidential and general elections on Sunday, InSight Crime developed a means to measure risk due to organized crime. The map was one of many that the lead organization in the study, Accion Ciudadana, used to measure the overall risk to politicians and others connected to the elections.
Obtain full Accion Ciudadana report, available only in Spanish, here.
Background and Methodology of InSight Crime's Part of the Study
Guatemala's criminal groups are local and international. They come from institutional settings and long-time criminal families. They are dangerous and ubiquitous, often overwhelming the few authorities who are intent on fighting them.
These organizations create their headquarters and necessarily operate in border states where many of them have long moved contraband, weapons, drugs, and other illegal goods in and out of Guatemala. Their names are, by now, well known. They include the Mendoza, Leon and Lorenzana families. Lately, two more have joined the ranks: the Overdick and Ortiz clans.
These families have long worked with outsiders who have used Guatemala as a reception point for airplanes and go-fast boats loaded with illegal drugs arriving from South America. The landing areas and ports were safer in Guatemala, as the authorities know their role and get their expected payoff.
The role of these organizations in this larger drug trade has traditionally been that of transportation, hence the name "transportistas" in the underworld. Some local organizations, however, were also dedicated to theft. This had an economic logic.
Guatemala occupies a critical point in the distribution chain. Prices for pure cocaine in this country are close to $7,000 per kilogram. But cross the border and bring that cocaine to Mexico City, and you can nearly double your money.
To eliminate part of that risk, some Guatemalan groups sought help from a Mexican organization known as the Zetas. The Zetas' core was made up of former Mexican and Guatemalan Special Forces. They did their job well.
In March 2008, the Zetas ambushed and killed eleven people in the state of Zacapa, including Juancho Leon, the leader of the feared Leon family, a major family dedicated mostly to intercepting and stealing cocaine from others.
The Zetas, however, were not satisfied with their role as enforcers. They have since created their own bases of operation throughout central, western, and northern Guatemala, displacing their allies and rivals alike.
The situation has reached a critical stage. The Zetas have declared war on any who oppose them, but it's often innocents who die, as witnessed in the recent massacre of 27 farm laborers in the Peten province.
There is also good reason to believe that the Zetas have made Guatemala their new, permanent home. In addition to the massacre, there are reports that its top leadership has used the country as a respite and staging area for all of their criminal activities.
In the middle of this turmoil are Guatemala's politicians. Some are courageous. Others are opportunistic. All of them are vulnerable, especially those who operate in these strategic trafficking corridors where these large criminal organizations have made their homes.
In essence, this was the risk we were trying to measure. Guatemala's elections are not as violent as, say, Colombia's or Mexico's. This has some logic to it. Unlike in those countries, where mayors decide who occupies important security posts and control large portions of the budget, Guatemala's mayors have severely limited powers.
Nevertheless, these local politicians, mayors as well as congressional representatives, can play a big role in both economic and security matters in their territories of electoral influence.
Local politicians also tend to influence media coverage as well as play important roles in the development of schools, hospitals, and other social and welfare projects.
For the criminal, all of these activities and responsibilities represent an opportunity. In some cases, it is an opportunity to win political support or a way to earn money via public works contracts. And in other cases, it's a matter of keeping the police and military away from the trafficking corridors, landing strips, and ports of entry.
As the importance of the corridor rises, so does the risk. This is especially true of areas that are in dispute, which brings us to the second stage of the study.
The way we measured disputes was to study the homicide rates in these municipalities between 2008 and 2010. Among those homicides, we separated those that occurred with a gun, as they tend to be more related to organized crime.
These homicides were catalogued per 100,000 inhabitants. The final tally was an average of the three years. Lastly, we divided the risky municipalities evenly into three groups. The result is an approximate risk value for each of these municipalities that lie in the criminal corridors.
By Steven Dudley
As part of a project to study political risk leading up to Guatemala's presidential and general elections on Sunday, InSight Crime developed a means to measure risk due to organized crime. The map was one of many that the lead organization in the study, Accion Ciudadana, used to measure the overall risk to politicians and others connected to the elections.
Obtain full Accion Ciudadana report, available only in Spanish, here.
Background and Methodology of InSight Crime's Part of the Study
Guatemala's criminal groups are local and international. They come from institutional settings and long-time criminal families. They are dangerous and ubiquitous, often overwhelming the few authorities who are intent on fighting them.
These organizations create their headquarters and necessarily operate in border states where many of them have long moved contraband, weapons, drugs, and other illegal goods in and out of Guatemala. Their names are, by now, well known. They include the Mendoza, Leon and Lorenzana families. Lately, two more have joined the ranks: the Overdick and Ortiz clans.
These families have long worked with outsiders who have used Guatemala as a reception point for airplanes and go-fast boats loaded with illegal drugs arriving from South America. The landing areas and ports were safer in Guatemala, as the authorities know their role and get their expected payoff.
The role of these organizations in this larger drug trade has traditionally been that of transportation, hence the name "transportistas" in the underworld. Some local organizations, however, were also dedicated to theft. This had an economic logic.
Guatemala occupies a critical point in the distribution chain. Prices for pure cocaine in this country are close to $7,000 per kilogram. But cross the border and bring that cocaine to Mexico City, and you can nearly double your money.
To eliminate part of that risk, some Guatemalan groups sought help from a Mexican organization known as the Zetas. The Zetas' core was made up of former Mexican and Guatemalan Special Forces. They did their job well.
In March 2008, the Zetas ambushed and killed eleven people in the state of Zacapa, including Juancho Leon, the leader of the feared Leon family, a major family dedicated mostly to intercepting and stealing cocaine from others.
The Zetas, however, were not satisfied with their role as enforcers. They have since created their own bases of operation throughout central, western, and northern Guatemala, displacing their allies and rivals alike.
The situation has reached a critical stage. The Zetas have declared war on any who oppose them, but it's often innocents who die, as witnessed in the recent massacre of 27 farm laborers in the Peten province.
There is also good reason to believe that the Zetas have made Guatemala their new, permanent home. In addition to the massacre, there are reports that its top leadership has used the country as a respite and staging area for all of their criminal activities.
In the middle of this turmoil are Guatemala's politicians. Some are courageous. Others are opportunistic. All of them are vulnerable, especially those who operate in these strategic trafficking corridors where these large criminal organizations have made their homes.
In essence, this was the risk we were trying to measure. Guatemala's elections are not as violent as, say, Colombia's or Mexico's. This has some logic to it. Unlike in those countries, where mayors decide who occupies important security posts and control large portions of the budget, Guatemala's mayors have severely limited powers.
Nevertheless, these local politicians, mayors as well as congressional representatives, can play a big role in both economic and security matters in their territories of electoral influence.
Local politicians also tend to influence media coverage as well as play important roles in the development of schools, hospitals, and other social and welfare projects.
For the criminal, all of these activities and responsibilities represent an opportunity. In some cases, it is an opportunity to win political support or a way to earn money via public works contracts. And in other cases, it's a matter of keeping the police and military away from the trafficking corridors, landing strips, and ports of entry.
As the importance of the corridor rises, so does the risk. This is especially true of areas that are in dispute, which brings us to the second stage of the study.
The way we measured disputes was to study the homicide rates in these municipalities between 2008 and 2010. Among those homicides, we separated those that occurred with a gun, as they tend to be more related to organized crime.
These homicides were catalogued per 100,000 inhabitants. The final tally was an average of the three years. Lastly, we divided the risky municipalities evenly into three groups. The result is an approximate risk value for each of these municipalities that lie in the criminal corridors.