SURVEILLANCE detection

Covert Munkey

Covert Munkey

Administrator
View attachment 39View attachment 40

SURVEILLANCE DETECTION

The Problem

Defence against concerted attacks by terrorists and criminals on a fixed facility, or key personnel in transit, is often problematic for a number of reasons.

Even well trained and equipped guards, a state-of-the-art CCTV system and a good relationship with local Police Force will only provide a reactive capability.

While physical security measures are essential as the ‘inner ring’ of protective security around facilities, terrorist groups and criminals have shown great resourcefulness in overcoming these.

History has shown that terrorists and criminals frequently change tactics. However, certain modes of attack preparation and criminality remain unchanged.

Investigations of past successful attacks reveal that attackers consistently engage in prior detailed planning necessary to identify, circumvent and neutralize security; identify the best attack sites; develop the attack methodology; and determine escape routes.

At times this may even include ‘dry runs’, or attack rehearsals disguised in seemingly harmless activity near the target.

The most popular method for attackers to obtain the information necessary to formulate and carry out an attack is to conduct detailed surveillance of their target over an extended period of time.

Conventional security measures generally focus on physical barriers and denial procedures. These measures do not reveal seemingly innocuous planning activity that may be taking place outside the security perimeter.

Detection of ‘pre-operational’ surveillance, in addition to physical and procedural methods, provides maximum effectiveness in disrupting, or mitigating, the effects of a terrorist attack, or other criminal acts.

CSSG trained specialist’s view the potential ‘target’ through the eyes of would-be attackers, in order to reveal prime surveillance positions that can be used by terrorists and or criminals.

View attachment 39
 
Last edited:
Good post

Indeed, SD if all too often neglected, but has been proven in government agencies to be a valuable tool in preventing hostile acts.

mts
 
The act of Hostile Reconnaissance is vital to the Terrorist / Kidnapper and adequate protection can make all the difference between surviving and not. Even basic skills are often missing, I train certain organisations in Counter Surveillance tactics and it amazes me how "blind" even people trained in the field can be. What Covert Munkey goes on to mention is the classic "Red Cell" techniques. they are bloody good fun (but still hard work) to put in place - where else do you get paid to break in somewhere for example ? If anyone is interested in more I can recommend the book Rogue Warrior by Richard Marcinko, the biographical one rather then the novels, there is even a DVD available of his Seal Teams doing all the above for real.

Nephilim

 
SD

CM

You are spot on - UK or US Security for critical infrastructure is NOT up to the task of preventing attacks- terrorist or organized criminal attacks without understanding this valuable skill set.

Tim
 
Agree with everything that has already been said. Find it astonishing the lack of appreciation of this blatant recognised tactic by the so-called big security firms, particularly those who reside over airports and other high profile targets.

Richie
 
Thank you mts

mts

Thank you- still finding my way around the CPW site and just reading a lot.

My schedule has got me hooping in the States and for the moment several groups are coming to us this quarter, which I have no problem with since I hate 15+ hrs on a plane.

Bram should be just getting back from your neck of the woods and his annual training trip to Israel.

Stay Safe and Once again Thank You

Tim
 
spent the last six years of my military service doing this type of work at goverment instalations with an organisation called the Home Service Force , private security companies dont want people with the experience and ability to conduct security at these sites and now the goverment state that these sites belong to the private sector and it's the private sectors responsibility and they only want to pay £5.80 per hour for security staff so guess what ,
TERRORISTS WILL ATTACK THESE SITES because their easy , we used to operate with UK special forces personel from the three services trying to improve the security of instalations 17yrs ago and were told our services were not required then the goverment set up the military provost guarding service to do the same job but with a reduced budget , then the united states goverment set up the homeland security organisationto do the same job and now its a big topic this is what we used to do before it was a major intrest topic ,
Anybody want to employ me ?

If private security companies want dedicated staff to protect vital instalations then they will have to increase their budgets for the security operatives or pay out for thr repairs to these facilities after a terrorist attack and the compensation claims that go with it
 
Last edited:
CM, you are correct.

But, any CS relies on the team (or individual) observing un-natural behaviour in potential attackers or having multiple sightings of them whilst on their recces.

The sophisticated and switched on attacker is not presenting himself in this way anymore. Only one walk past and never seen again. Only one drivepast (by someone else) and never seen again, and they won't be seen sat in cars for hours on end nearby either.

The less sophisticated will be pinged - but only by alert security.

Pete @ ISS
 
Have a great deal of sympathy with all the above !

I visit 'sensitive' sites on regular basis, with more demo surveillance hardware than most establishments dream about, including frequent overseas travel.

The normal 'casual' vehicle / baggage inspection has never invited comment, and in fact, only once, on a ferry crossing to Ireland 10yrs ago, has a physical inspection of the back of the vehicle invited an 'Oh shit ! Can I get my boss ? He's got to see this !...and an invite to return and see them on my return.

I've lost count of the number of civillian agency gate guards that have waved me through after a cursory inspection. There are a few 'honourable exceptions' where my vehicle remains firmly in the visitors car park, outside the gates, but even then they haven't checked whether cameras & Tx capability has been disabled. (Although to be fair, they probably have capability to detect if I'm actually transmitting anything.)
 
I agree with all thats been said! Even though I work in Casino Surveillance they regularly fail to see the importance of running any kind of training scenarios, including those than can be run behind scenes. Time after time we catch things that are easily preventable IF people are properly trained to recognise the the early signs. I train my department as best as I can, but if it cost money it aint going to happen!
 
isstraining said:
CM, you are correct.

But, any CS relies on the team (or individual) observing un-natural behaviour in potential attackers or having multiple sightings of them whilst on their recces.

The sophisticated and switched on attacker is not presenting himself in this way anymore. Only one walk past and never seen again. Only one drivepast (by someone else) and never seen again, and they won't be seen sat in cars for hours on end nearby either.

The less sophisticated will be pinged - but only by alert security.

Pete @ ISS
Click to expand...

Reviving an old thread.

Peter, as you know CS and SD are different animals. What you state above is correct however that's the traditional SD/CS schools of thought and that's one of the area's where we've (my company) have improved and setting the standard globally for this, both in the private and government sectors.

m
 
I think whoever wrote this has read part of the manual. What he starts of by referring to are the phases of a terrorist attack only he is using made up terminology meaning he does not understand the process. In other words he is missing parts out and that could be dangerous.

Phase one Starts with target selection, this is in two parts general and specific, this is very important to recognize as it requires different planning principles. Phase two is intelligence gathering of which surveillance is but one part.

Teaching surveillance as a stand alone hostile intelligence gathering method is again not good as it is not even the key method. Also it seems to indicate he does not know the difference between surveillance used to collect criminal evidence where the target is watched at all times and attack surveillance which depends on minimal exposure. This requires a different detection method?

In the bit about probability he touched on the enemy’s view which is a lesser part of probability studies. In depth this covers a number of intelligence gathering methods that will highlight attack sites, ideal attack sites, probable attack sites etc. this is then followed by other types of studies which comes under Identifying Hazardous, Locations, Activities and Situations. It is a very in depth subject. Not just someone thinking like the enemy.

With physical security again he has not done the full course which uses key point security as the base. To ensure physical security it starts with the security program plan and ensure that the security of an establishment is complete at all levels. In the teaching it starts with “every eventuality must be coveredâ€.

Nothing is new here; he has skimmed over a number of subjects where as each one should be covered in detail and follow a logical established format using recognized headings. I think the author of this has read part of the book and is trying to put it out as something new. In fact just touching on keys subjects is dangerous.

So sorry CM.
 
NGIP;

I think perhaps that you're thinking too much. No-one is doubting what you have mentioned, I merely think the opening post to this thread was specifically discussing Surveillance Detection / Counter Surveillance, which is just one aspect of the broad subject of installation security, but is none the less a subject in it's own right.

I feel that the opening post by one of the owners of Close Protection World, was a discussion starter on Surveillance Detection / Counter Surveillance...
 
NGIP said:
I think whoever wrote this has read part of the manual. What he starts of by referring to are the phases of a terrorist attack only he is using made up terminology meaning he does not understand the process. In other words he is missing parts out and that could be dangerous.

Phase one Starts with target selection, this is in two parts general and specific, this is very important to recognize as it requires different planning principles. Phase two is intelligence gathering of which surveillance is but one part.

Teaching surveillance as a stand alone hostile Az gathering method is again not good as it is not even the key method. Also it seems to indicate he does not know the difference between surveillance used to collect criminal evidence where the target is watched at all times and attack surveillance which depends on minimal exposure. This requires a different detection method?

 In the bit about probability he touched on the enemy’s view which is a lesser part of probability studies. In depth this covers a number of intelligence gathering methods that will highlight attack sites, ideal attack sites, probable attack sites etc. this is then followed by other types of studies which comes under Identifying Hazardous, Locations, Activities and Situations. It is a very in depth subject. Not just someone thinking like the enemy.

With physical security again he has not done the full course which uses key point security as the base. To ensure physical security it starts with the security program plan and ensure that the security of an establishment is complete at all levels. In the teaching it starts with “every eventuality must be covered”.

 Nothing is new here; he has skimmed over a number of subjects where as each one should be covered in detail and follow a logical established format using recognized headings. I think the author of this has read part of the book and is trying to put it out as something new. In fact just touching on keys subjects is dangerous.

So sorry CM.
Click to expand...


Whilst your points are very valid at first glance, i disagree with the way's you've tied them all together

1. Thinking like the enemy is exactly what you mentioned; knowing your enemy greatly assists in assessing probability of an attack as well as covering eventuality's (as in my point #2) :" In the bit about probability he touched on the enemy’s view which is a lesser part of probability studies. In depth this covers a number of intelligence gathering methods that will highlight attack sites, ideal attack sites, probable attack sites etc. this is then followed by other types of studies which comes under Identifying Hazardous, Locations, Activities and Situations. It is a very in depth subject. Not just someone thinking like the enemy."

2. You write: "With physical security again he has not done the full course which uses key point security as the base. To ensure physical security it starts with the security program plan and ensure that the security of an establishment is complete at all levels. In the teaching it starts with “every eventuality must be covered”."

Which "course?". How does one cover every eventuality?

3. I agree 100% that surveillance IS NOT surveillance detection. I agree 100% that SD awareness (at least) must be part of a security program.
I agree 100% that choke points, routines, vulnerable/attractive areas must be considered in the security program.

4. From the way that you write, i strongly assume you were part of an official SD program. (i know because I helped architect the pilot program many moons ago and have greatly improved on it since.)
M
 
Last edited:
RW1 said:
... specifically discussing Surveillance Detection / Counter Surveillance, which is just one aspect of the broad subject of installation security, but is none the less a subject in it's own right.Detection / Counter Surveillance...
Click to expand...

RW, not only installation, moreso even for CP/EP.

Stay safe

m
 
Important to note:

Many gov operators class 'counter' as inclusive of SD. The recent euphoria over surveillance detection has only begun in the last few years or so. Prior to the now popular term 'SD', it was always included as in the 'Counter' role!

I have to say that I do agree with RW1. Not wishing to upset the applecart again with you NGIP but you do have a tendency to fly off at a tangent and harp on about wiffle waffle that bears little or no relation to what is being discussed.

I would be intrigued as to the 'danger' surrounding any brief outline concerning job functions! If it was as a training manual then yes, dangerous it maybe but on a public forum? Get real.



Rich H
 
Last edited by a moderator:
mts said:



4. From the way that you write, i strongly assume you were part of an official SD program. (i know because I helped architect the pilot program many moons ago and have greatly improved on it since.)
M
[/FONT]
Click to expand...

I don't - I think he's a total bluffer and writes utter crap.



Rich H
 
Rich H said:
Important to note:

Many gov operators class 'counter' as inclusive of SD. The recent euphoria over surveillance detection has only began in the last few years or so. Prior to the now popular term 'SD', it was always included as in the 'Counter' role!

......
I would be intrigued as to the 'danger' surrounding any brief outline concerning job functions! If it was as a training manual then yes, dangerous it maybe but on a public forum? Get real.



Rich H
Click to expand...
Spot on Rich.

This is also (SD aspect) now tricking into the private/commercial sector as well.

m
 
Back
Top