Background
Over the last few years many shipping companies and security advisors have seen the deployment of armed guards as the best solution to the problem of piracy. While it is the case at the time of writing that no ship carrying armed guards has been captured off Somalia there are a number of serious issues relating to the use of armed guards on civilian vessels which need to be considered.
The issues relate to the legality of the carriage of weapons onboard ships; the potential legal liability of the ship’s Master and the owners where armed guards kill or injure third parties, or cause damage to the ship and its cargo; the cost of deploying armed guards; and the consequences of over-reliance on armed guards at the expense of other protective measures. I will also look at the emerging international guidelines and the need to establish effective rules of engagement for the use armed guards.
Legality of carrying firearms under International Law
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 (“UNCLOSâ€) regulates activity on the high seas generally, rather than the carriage of weapons in particular. Instead, Article 94(1) of UNCLOS stipulates that each State must exercise jurisdiction and control over vessels flying its flag. Accordingly, it is up to each individual State to legislate on this matter. So the regulations governing the carriage of weapons are those laid down by the flag state, but a vessel must also comply with the law within the waters of each coastal state it enters. A state may therefore prohibit the carriage of any weapons into its territory, even though there is no contravention of the law of the ship’s flag state. As at February 2012 states including France, Spain (where a licence is also required), Saudi Arabia, Kenya and Brazil required prior notice that a ship was carrying weapons, Australia also required registration with a number of government agencies. In South Africa all firearms must be registered, which in practice means that foreign vessels cannot bring guns into the country; in one week in 2011 two masters were arrested and charged under the South African Firearm Control Act.[1] Although national requirements change, and this is far from being a comprehensive list, it does highlight the fact that the carriage of weapons on board merchant ships is not straight-forward. Indeed, some armed response teams have illegally hidden weapons on board a ship, creating a potential legal problem for the Master and the ship’s owners; while some others have been forced to ditch their weapons overboard before entering national waters, in order to avoid problems.
Some countries, like the United States, have actively encouraged the use of armed guards. U. S. Coast Guard Maritime Security Directive 104-6 (series) requires U.S. flagged vessels operating in the Horn of Africa (HOA) and Gulf of Aden (GOA) regions to provide additional armed or unarmed security as needed. However, other countries were, at least initially, reluctant to endorse such measures.
The International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code requires all vessels flagged in a signatory state of SOLAS (International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974), to put in place a safety plan specific to each vessel. These measures are not prescriptive, and so the carriage or use of firearms for self-defence is not prohibited. The International Maritime Organisation (“IMOâ€) initially strongly discouraged but did not prohibit the carriage and use of firearms by seafarers for the purpose of defence from piracy. Increasingly it is moving towards the adoption of an international regime to be established which will provide a framework for flag states that decide to allow vessels to deploy arms on board, according to the IMO’s secretary-general Koji Sekimizu. Mr. Sekimizu dismissed the current industry schemes, and said ‘What is clear now is that the way forward is not industry self-regulation on a voluntary basis.’ [2] The IMO has issued guidelines to security companies and shipowners.
There are serious concerns about the dangers of carrying weapons. In particular, there is concern as to whether some of the armed guards deployed have sufficient competency and skill to use weapons, and apprehension that the use of weapons may escalate an already dangerous situation.
Criminal sanctions
If someone is killed or injured in the territorial waters of a country or in a port, the perpetrator of the killing may be subject to the criminal laws of that country. States are also likely to claim jurisdiction where their citizens are killed in unlawful circumstances in international waters; as India has done in the case of the killing of two Indian fishermen by the Italian naval guards, Latore Massimiliano and Salvatore Girone, who were onboard the MV Enrica Lexie in February 2012. Italy has claimed that the vessel was in international waters when the incident took place. Italy says the shooting took place in international waters outside the jurisdiction of Indian courts. India disputes this, saying the incident occurred in a “contiguous zone†where Indian law applies.[3] The two Italians face charges of murder if the Indian Supreme Court claims jurisdiction.
In a previous incident off Oman in April 2010, crew from a passing cargo ship fired upon a group of fishermen, thinking they were pirates, killing one of them and injuring another. Raju Ambrose, 34, was declared ‘dead on arrival’ by doctors at the Sultan Qaboos Hospital in Salalah on the southwestern coast of Oman. Shots were fired without any warning or provocation from the ship at the group of nearly 75 fishermen who had set off from Salalah in 25 boats.[4] I believe, from conversations with maritime officers, that there have been many similar incidents, and most have gone unreported because the victims were killed far out at sea. It does appear that many security guards are virtually untrained and are not operating with any rules of engagement, and that seeing a man in a small boat they will shoot him without asking questions. What is surprising about the incident off Kerala involving the Italians is that they were trained military personnel, who would have been expected to fire warning shots, not fatal rounds.
There are likely to be criminal and civil law implications for the guards, the master and the ship owner under most Flag State national laws if death or personal injury is caused by the use of a firearm. Not all States will exonerate the user of the firearm on the basis that he acted in self-defence. Seafarers may therefore find themselves facing unforeseen penal consequences under foreign laws. The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, in its M/V Saiga No 2 judgment, which related to naval personnel, said that ‘international law … requires that the use of force must be avoided as far as possible and, where force is inevitable, it must not go beyond what is reasonable and necessary in the circumstances. Considerations of humanity must apply in the law of the sea, as they do in other areas of international law.’ The judgment further suggests that practices which are normally followed before resorting to force must be used. These include both visual and auditory signals such as firing shots across the bows, and a variety of other measures.
Insurance Issues
There are a number of insurance issues which shipowners need to concern themselves with. The first set of issues relates to insurance against damage, death or injury, caused by the armed guards, and the second set relates to compliance with the provisions of the insurance contracts which cover the vessel and its cargo.
Section 41 of the UK Marine Insurance Act 1906 implies into every contract of insurance a warranty that the voyage is lawful and that, so far as the assured can control the matter, the voyage will be carried out in a lawful manner. If the assured decides to undertake self-defence involving lethal weapons, this could amount to carrying out the voyage in an unlawful manner. For public policy reasons, a breach of the implied warranty of legality cannot be waived by underwriters. If the shipowner’s self-defence measures are not lawful, then underwriters will be automatically discharged from liability under the policy from the breach onwards. As a further point, many contracts will contain provisions which will oblige owners to waive their right of recourse against the security company, should they have caused damage or loss to the vessel. In view of this, hull and war risks underwriters need to review and approve the ship’s insurance contract when armed guards are carried.
The Cost of Using Armed Guards
It is normally estimated that a shipowner will pay around US$5,000 or more a day for a team of three to four armed guards. For a ship that regularly transits the Gulf of Aden and/or the Indian Ocean they may carry armed teams for around 100 days a year, at a cost of US$500,000 a year. For an industry that is suffering from depressed freight rates, particularly for bulk carriers (reference the collapse in the Baltic Dry Index), this represents a severe financial burden. Other measures, including hardening the ship and the use of water cannon, can normally be undertaken for a reasonable fixed cost and represent a real alternative to the use of armed guards. It is also the case that the use of armed guards does not mean that other protective measures are not required. I have read at least one confidential report in which it was said that the pirates nearly overwhelmed the guards, and the ship had no other defensive measures in place to fall back on.
At the minimum a ship transiting the Indian Ocean, the Gulf of Oman and the Gulf of Aden needs to have effective razor wire in place, a citadel and armouring for the bridge and preferably the accommodation decks. Best Management Practices Version 4 (BMP4)[5] says that ‘If pirates are unable to board a ship they cannot hijack it.’ BMP4 adds that ‘if armed Private Maritime Security Contractors are to be used they must be as an additional layer of protection and not as an alternative to BMP.’[6]
The Management of Armed Guards
The management of armed guards on ships raises a number of problems. Article 34-1 of SOLAS Regulations provides that, ‘The Owner, Charterer, the Company operating the ship as defined in Regulation 1X/1 or any other person shall not prevent or restrict the Master of the ship from taking or executing any decision which, in the Master’s professional judgment, is necessary for the safety of life at sea and protection of the marine environment’. This is reiterated in the ISPS Code which requires that the Master of the ship must have the ultimate responsibility for the safety and security of the ship. So legally the Master of the ship must be in charge. However, security companies often demand that the Master does not have overall control over their operations, nor make the final decision as to whether or not weapons are deployed and used. That decision may rest with the security team, on terms that the Master only need be consulted “if there is timeâ€. The justification is that, if faced with a lethal threat, the right to self defence outweighs the Master’s overall responsibility to his crew and the environment. This means the Master may not have full control of a key area of the vessel’s security, which in turn may affect the safety of the crew and vessel. Further, there may be a contractual obligation with the security company to follow ‘security’ instructions from the guards, which may even extend to the re-routing of the vessel, which in turn may result in a breach of contractual obligations to charterers and/or cargo interests.
In all circumstances the use of weapons on any ship must be governed by clear Rules for the Use of Force (‘RUF’) agreed by the owner and the security company. At present there are no generally accepted standards for RUF. The RUF should reflect the laws of the flag state. They should also make clear that lethal force should only be used where there is serious and imminent threat to life, and only where use is proportionate. The use of armed guards places a serious responsibility on the shoulders of the Master and the shipowner, and in particular on the company’s directors, who may be held to be personally liable where death or serious injury results. The shipowner should also have a process in place to review the proposals for the provisions of armed guards, to have knowledge of the personnel used, of the weapons deployed and their licensing and for training the ship’s crew how to react in case of an engagement.
Some relevant factors for consideration when hiring a security company include:
* References;
* The place of registration & business, how long they have conducted business and the size of the organisation;
* The background, experience and qualifications of the management and personnel;
[etc] Whether the company has specific marine experience;
Whether sub-contractors are permitted;
Whether the Company is a member of any industry organisations such as the BAPSC (British Association of Private Security Companies) or SAMI (Security Association for the Maritime Industry);
If the company has signed or is it willing to follow the IOCC (International Code of Conduct for Private Security Companies);
Whether the law and jurisdiction provided for in the contract are acceptable to the shipowners and their underwriters;
If the company offers additional services beyond that of security;
Whether they are independently audited; and
Whether they have implemented a ‘no drug, smoking and alcohol’ policy.
International Guidelines
In May 2011 the International Maritime Organization (IMO) approved interim guidance to shipowners, ship operators and shipmasters on the use of private armed security personnel on ships. This guidance was revised and issued by the IMO as MS.1/Circ. 1405 on the 25th May 2012. Other guidance documents were also issued to flag states. The IMO did not endorse the use of armed guards, but said that, ‘The absence of applicable regulation and industry self-regulation coupled with complex legal requirements governing the legitimate transport, carriage and use of firearms2 gives cause for concern. This situation is further complicated by the rapid growth in the number of private maritime security companies (PMSC) and doubts about the capabilities and maturity of some of these companies.’[7] The IMO added that, ‘The use of PCASP [privately contracted armed security personnel] should not be considered as an alternative to Best Management Practices (BMP) and other protective measures. Placing armed guards on board as a means to secure and protect the ship and its crew should only be considered after a risk assessment has been carried out. It is also important to involve the Master in the decision making process.’[8]
The IMO’s guidelines stress the importance of undertaking a risk assessment and, if it is decided to use armed guards, to undertake a full evaluation before selected a supplier. It also says that, ‘As the quality of the service delivery depends to a very great extent on the quality and experience of the individuals that make up the onboard PCASP team, the quality of the selection and vetting of that team is essential. PMSC should demonstrate that they have verifiable, written internal policies and procedures for determining suitability of their employees.’[9] The guidelines also deal with insurance issues, the licensing and control of firearms, the composition of the armed team, command and control issues, training, record-keeping and rules for the use of force (RUF). These guidelines represent a logical and sensible approach to the deployment of armed guards, although it will be a long time before all shipowners follow them.
At present there are large numbers of untrained and unsuitable men acting as armed guards, the bad, the good and the downright awful. I have heard stories of bus drivers, middle-aged prison officers and other similar ‘adventurers’ going to sea with guns, of ex-soldiers spending weeks being sea-sick, of men from the Far East being paid less that $100 a day and having no weapons training, and of teams of three (four is the minimum, two on watch at any time) who would stand little chance if a surprise attack caught them unaware. Unfortunately it is only a matter of time before an armed team is overwhelmed, the aftermath would be bloody as revenge was taken, and the consequences do not bear thinking about. To repeat BMP4, ‘if armed Private Maritime Security Contractors are to be used they must be as an additional layer of protection and not as an alternative to BMP.’
This is not to argue that armed guards should never be used. For slow and vulnerable vessels like cable layers, tugs, oil rigs and the like there is no alternative, but for modern fast vessels in full compliance with BMP4, and possibly with additional protection from effective water cannon, guards are an option, not a necessity. It all depends on the vessel and the security assessment undertaken by the shipowner. Local regulations can also limit the use of armed personnel, for example off West Africa, so armed guards can never be a universal answer to ship security. India’s attempts in 2012 to try two Italian marines for murder also highlight the risks that armed guards and their employers run; there are no easy solutions.
Over the last few years many shipping companies and security advisors have seen the deployment of armed guards as the best solution to the problem of piracy. While it is the case at the time of writing that no ship carrying armed guards has been captured off Somalia there are a number of serious issues relating to the use of armed guards on civilian vessels which need to be considered.
The issues relate to the legality of the carriage of weapons onboard ships; the potential legal liability of the ship’s Master and the owners where armed guards kill or injure third parties, or cause damage to the ship and its cargo; the cost of deploying armed guards; and the consequences of over-reliance on armed guards at the expense of other protective measures. I will also look at the emerging international guidelines and the need to establish effective rules of engagement for the use armed guards.
Legality of carrying firearms under International Law
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 (“UNCLOSâ€) regulates activity on the high seas generally, rather than the carriage of weapons in particular. Instead, Article 94(1) of UNCLOS stipulates that each State must exercise jurisdiction and control over vessels flying its flag. Accordingly, it is up to each individual State to legislate on this matter. So the regulations governing the carriage of weapons are those laid down by the flag state, but a vessel must also comply with the law within the waters of each coastal state it enters. A state may therefore prohibit the carriage of any weapons into its territory, even though there is no contravention of the law of the ship’s flag state. As at February 2012 states including France, Spain (where a licence is also required), Saudi Arabia, Kenya and Brazil required prior notice that a ship was carrying weapons, Australia also required registration with a number of government agencies. In South Africa all firearms must be registered, which in practice means that foreign vessels cannot bring guns into the country; in one week in 2011 two masters were arrested and charged under the South African Firearm Control Act.[1] Although national requirements change, and this is far from being a comprehensive list, it does highlight the fact that the carriage of weapons on board merchant ships is not straight-forward. Indeed, some armed response teams have illegally hidden weapons on board a ship, creating a potential legal problem for the Master and the ship’s owners; while some others have been forced to ditch their weapons overboard before entering national waters, in order to avoid problems.
Some countries, like the United States, have actively encouraged the use of armed guards. U. S. Coast Guard Maritime Security Directive 104-6 (series) requires U.S. flagged vessels operating in the Horn of Africa (HOA) and Gulf of Aden (GOA) regions to provide additional armed or unarmed security as needed. However, other countries were, at least initially, reluctant to endorse such measures.
The International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code requires all vessels flagged in a signatory state of SOLAS (International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974), to put in place a safety plan specific to each vessel. These measures are not prescriptive, and so the carriage or use of firearms for self-defence is not prohibited. The International Maritime Organisation (“IMOâ€) initially strongly discouraged but did not prohibit the carriage and use of firearms by seafarers for the purpose of defence from piracy. Increasingly it is moving towards the adoption of an international regime to be established which will provide a framework for flag states that decide to allow vessels to deploy arms on board, according to the IMO’s secretary-general Koji Sekimizu. Mr. Sekimizu dismissed the current industry schemes, and said ‘What is clear now is that the way forward is not industry self-regulation on a voluntary basis.’ [2] The IMO has issued guidelines to security companies and shipowners.
There are serious concerns about the dangers of carrying weapons. In particular, there is concern as to whether some of the armed guards deployed have sufficient competency and skill to use weapons, and apprehension that the use of weapons may escalate an already dangerous situation.
Criminal sanctions
If someone is killed or injured in the territorial waters of a country or in a port, the perpetrator of the killing may be subject to the criminal laws of that country. States are also likely to claim jurisdiction where their citizens are killed in unlawful circumstances in international waters; as India has done in the case of the killing of two Indian fishermen by the Italian naval guards, Latore Massimiliano and Salvatore Girone, who were onboard the MV Enrica Lexie in February 2012. Italy has claimed that the vessel was in international waters when the incident took place. Italy says the shooting took place in international waters outside the jurisdiction of Indian courts. India disputes this, saying the incident occurred in a “contiguous zone†where Indian law applies.[3] The two Italians face charges of murder if the Indian Supreme Court claims jurisdiction.
In a previous incident off Oman in April 2010, crew from a passing cargo ship fired upon a group of fishermen, thinking they were pirates, killing one of them and injuring another. Raju Ambrose, 34, was declared ‘dead on arrival’ by doctors at the Sultan Qaboos Hospital in Salalah on the southwestern coast of Oman. Shots were fired without any warning or provocation from the ship at the group of nearly 75 fishermen who had set off from Salalah in 25 boats.[4] I believe, from conversations with maritime officers, that there have been many similar incidents, and most have gone unreported because the victims were killed far out at sea. It does appear that many security guards are virtually untrained and are not operating with any rules of engagement, and that seeing a man in a small boat they will shoot him without asking questions. What is surprising about the incident off Kerala involving the Italians is that they were trained military personnel, who would have been expected to fire warning shots, not fatal rounds.
There are likely to be criminal and civil law implications for the guards, the master and the ship owner under most Flag State national laws if death or personal injury is caused by the use of a firearm. Not all States will exonerate the user of the firearm on the basis that he acted in self-defence. Seafarers may therefore find themselves facing unforeseen penal consequences under foreign laws. The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, in its M/V Saiga No 2 judgment, which related to naval personnel, said that ‘international law … requires that the use of force must be avoided as far as possible and, where force is inevitable, it must not go beyond what is reasonable and necessary in the circumstances. Considerations of humanity must apply in the law of the sea, as they do in other areas of international law.’ The judgment further suggests that practices which are normally followed before resorting to force must be used. These include both visual and auditory signals such as firing shots across the bows, and a variety of other measures.
Insurance Issues
There are a number of insurance issues which shipowners need to concern themselves with. The first set of issues relates to insurance against damage, death or injury, caused by the armed guards, and the second set relates to compliance with the provisions of the insurance contracts which cover the vessel and its cargo.
Section 41 of the UK Marine Insurance Act 1906 implies into every contract of insurance a warranty that the voyage is lawful and that, so far as the assured can control the matter, the voyage will be carried out in a lawful manner. If the assured decides to undertake self-defence involving lethal weapons, this could amount to carrying out the voyage in an unlawful manner. For public policy reasons, a breach of the implied warranty of legality cannot be waived by underwriters. If the shipowner’s self-defence measures are not lawful, then underwriters will be automatically discharged from liability under the policy from the breach onwards. As a further point, many contracts will contain provisions which will oblige owners to waive their right of recourse against the security company, should they have caused damage or loss to the vessel. In view of this, hull and war risks underwriters need to review and approve the ship’s insurance contract when armed guards are carried.
The Cost of Using Armed Guards
It is normally estimated that a shipowner will pay around US$5,000 or more a day for a team of three to four armed guards. For a ship that regularly transits the Gulf of Aden and/or the Indian Ocean they may carry armed teams for around 100 days a year, at a cost of US$500,000 a year. For an industry that is suffering from depressed freight rates, particularly for bulk carriers (reference the collapse in the Baltic Dry Index), this represents a severe financial burden. Other measures, including hardening the ship and the use of water cannon, can normally be undertaken for a reasonable fixed cost and represent a real alternative to the use of armed guards. It is also the case that the use of armed guards does not mean that other protective measures are not required. I have read at least one confidential report in which it was said that the pirates nearly overwhelmed the guards, and the ship had no other defensive measures in place to fall back on.
At the minimum a ship transiting the Indian Ocean, the Gulf of Oman and the Gulf of Aden needs to have effective razor wire in place, a citadel and armouring for the bridge and preferably the accommodation decks. Best Management Practices Version 4 (BMP4)[5] says that ‘If pirates are unable to board a ship they cannot hijack it.’ BMP4 adds that ‘if armed Private Maritime Security Contractors are to be used they must be as an additional layer of protection and not as an alternative to BMP.’[6]
The Management of Armed Guards
The management of armed guards on ships raises a number of problems. Article 34-1 of SOLAS Regulations provides that, ‘The Owner, Charterer, the Company operating the ship as defined in Regulation 1X/1 or any other person shall not prevent or restrict the Master of the ship from taking or executing any decision which, in the Master’s professional judgment, is necessary for the safety of life at sea and protection of the marine environment’. This is reiterated in the ISPS Code which requires that the Master of the ship must have the ultimate responsibility for the safety and security of the ship. So legally the Master of the ship must be in charge. However, security companies often demand that the Master does not have overall control over their operations, nor make the final decision as to whether or not weapons are deployed and used. That decision may rest with the security team, on terms that the Master only need be consulted “if there is timeâ€. The justification is that, if faced with a lethal threat, the right to self defence outweighs the Master’s overall responsibility to his crew and the environment. This means the Master may not have full control of a key area of the vessel’s security, which in turn may affect the safety of the crew and vessel. Further, there may be a contractual obligation with the security company to follow ‘security’ instructions from the guards, which may even extend to the re-routing of the vessel, which in turn may result in a breach of contractual obligations to charterers and/or cargo interests.
In all circumstances the use of weapons on any ship must be governed by clear Rules for the Use of Force (‘RUF’) agreed by the owner and the security company. At present there are no generally accepted standards for RUF. The RUF should reflect the laws of the flag state. They should also make clear that lethal force should only be used where there is serious and imminent threat to life, and only where use is proportionate. The use of armed guards places a serious responsibility on the shoulders of the Master and the shipowner, and in particular on the company’s directors, who may be held to be personally liable where death or serious injury results. The shipowner should also have a process in place to review the proposals for the provisions of armed guards, to have knowledge of the personnel used, of the weapons deployed and their licensing and for training the ship’s crew how to react in case of an engagement.
Some relevant factors for consideration when hiring a security company include:
* References;
* The place of registration & business, how long they have conducted business and the size of the organisation;
* The background, experience and qualifications of the management and personnel;
[etc] Whether the company has specific marine experience;
Whether sub-contractors are permitted;
Whether the Company is a member of any industry organisations such as the BAPSC (British Association of Private Security Companies) or SAMI (Security Association for the Maritime Industry);
If the company has signed or is it willing to follow the IOCC (International Code of Conduct for Private Security Companies);
Whether the law and jurisdiction provided for in the contract are acceptable to the shipowners and their underwriters;
If the company offers additional services beyond that of security;
Whether they are independently audited; and
Whether they have implemented a ‘no drug, smoking and alcohol’ policy.
International Guidelines
In May 2011 the International Maritime Organization (IMO) approved interim guidance to shipowners, ship operators and shipmasters on the use of private armed security personnel on ships. This guidance was revised and issued by the IMO as MS.1/Circ. 1405 on the 25th May 2012. Other guidance documents were also issued to flag states. The IMO did not endorse the use of armed guards, but said that, ‘The absence of applicable regulation and industry self-regulation coupled with complex legal requirements governing the legitimate transport, carriage and use of firearms2 gives cause for concern. This situation is further complicated by the rapid growth in the number of private maritime security companies (PMSC) and doubts about the capabilities and maturity of some of these companies.’[7] The IMO added that, ‘The use of PCASP [privately contracted armed security personnel] should not be considered as an alternative to Best Management Practices (BMP) and other protective measures. Placing armed guards on board as a means to secure and protect the ship and its crew should only be considered after a risk assessment has been carried out. It is also important to involve the Master in the decision making process.’[8]
The IMO’s guidelines stress the importance of undertaking a risk assessment and, if it is decided to use armed guards, to undertake a full evaluation before selected a supplier. It also says that, ‘As the quality of the service delivery depends to a very great extent on the quality and experience of the individuals that make up the onboard PCASP team, the quality of the selection and vetting of that team is essential. PMSC should demonstrate that they have verifiable, written internal policies and procedures for determining suitability of their employees.’[9] The guidelines also deal with insurance issues, the licensing and control of firearms, the composition of the armed team, command and control issues, training, record-keeping and rules for the use of force (RUF). These guidelines represent a logical and sensible approach to the deployment of armed guards, although it will be a long time before all shipowners follow them.
At present there are large numbers of untrained and unsuitable men acting as armed guards, the bad, the good and the downright awful. I have heard stories of bus drivers, middle-aged prison officers and other similar ‘adventurers’ going to sea with guns, of ex-soldiers spending weeks being sea-sick, of men from the Far East being paid less that $100 a day and having no weapons training, and of teams of three (four is the minimum, two on watch at any time) who would stand little chance if a surprise attack caught them unaware. Unfortunately it is only a matter of time before an armed team is overwhelmed, the aftermath would be bloody as revenge was taken, and the consequences do not bear thinking about. To repeat BMP4, ‘if armed Private Maritime Security Contractors are to be used they must be as an additional layer of protection and not as an alternative to BMP.’
This is not to argue that armed guards should never be used. For slow and vulnerable vessels like cable layers, tugs, oil rigs and the like there is no alternative, but for modern fast vessels in full compliance with BMP4, and possibly with additional protection from effective water cannon, guards are an option, not a necessity. It all depends on the vessel and the security assessment undertaken by the shipowner. Local regulations can also limit the use of armed personnel, for example off West Africa, so armed guards can never be a universal answer to ship security. India’s attempts in 2012 to try two Italian marines for murder also highlight the risks that armed guards and their employers run; there are no easy solutions.
